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ESSAY
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: THE EFFECT OF
HOLDING STATE CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A JUDGE RUNNING
FOR RE-ELECTION
ROBERT P. DAVIDOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a number of cases death-row inmates have found them-
selves challenging their convictions and death sentences in state
collateral proceedings presided over by a judge running for re-
election.1 Of what significance in federal habeas corpus is the
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. A.B., Dartmouth College;
J.D., University of Michigan; LL.M., Harvard University; J.S.D., Columbia
University.
1. The precise frequency with which this situation arises is unknown. No
reported case has discussed this situation. I am aware of five cases in which a
collateral hearing was scheduled to be held during an election campaign. In
one case recusal was summarily ordered by an appellate court, State ex. rel.
Messiah v. Whitley, 588 So. 2d 91 (La. 1991), although the simultaneity of
hearing and re-election campaign was only one of the issues raised in behalf of
Messiah. Telephone Conversation with Nicholas Trenticosta, Executive
Director, Loyola Death Penalty Resource Center (October 15, 1993). In
another case, State v. Lopez, No. C 68946 (Dist. Ct. Clark Co., Nev.) (Motion
for Stay of Decision Pending Election, filed June 2, 1992), the motion for stay
was denied, and the case is now in appeal. Telephone conversation with
Michael Pescetta, Director, Nevada Appellate and Post-Conviction Project, Inc.
(October 19, 1993). In a third case, the issue was raised in a Motion for Change
of Venue or, in the Alternative, Recusal, Ex Parte Macies, No. 41270, (168thJud.
Dist. Ct., El Paso Co., Tex., filed Sept. 6, 1988), but the motion failed. Address
by Douglas Robinson before the ABA Post Conviction Death Penalty
Representation Project, Washington, DC (July 14, 1993). (Eventually, the U.S.
Court of Appeals affirmed a U.S. District Court judgment granting a petition
for writ of habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial. Martinez - Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).) In a fourth
case, State v. Coleman, No. 84 CF 811 (Cir. Ct., Lake Co., Ill., July 2, 1993), in
which I continue to act as co-counsel, the issue was not raised, and the petition
for post conviction relief was denied. In a fifth case, counsel filed a motion in
March 1993 to disqualify a judge before whom post-conviction proceedings
were pending and who was scheduled to appear on the ballot in a retention
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coincidence of re-election campaigns and the holding of the
hearings?
Although procedures vary somewhat from state to state, capi-
tal collateral proceedings typically commence in a trial-level
court following unsuccessful appeals to the state intermediate
appellate court (where permitted) and the highest state appel-
late court and denial of discretionary review by the United States
Supreme Court. State collateral proceedings are analogous to
federal habeas corpus but must precede federal habeas corpus
because of the need to exhaust state remedies before an incarcer-
ated person is permitted to seek federal habeas corpus.
At least three related issues arise in federal habeas corpus.2
First, does the simultaneity of state court election and the con-
duct of state collateral proceedings deprive the defendant of an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment
(i.e., search and seizure) issues? If so, the defendant is not auto-
matically denied habeas relief when arguing a violation of Fourth
election in November 1993. Wise v. State, No. 627 655 (21stJud. Cir., St. Louis
Co., Mo., filed March 30, 1993).
Undoubtedly, this situation has arisen in other unreported cases, especially
in jurisdictions in which judges' terms are very short (for example 4 years).
Telephone Conversations with Brent Newton, Texas Resource Center (October
19, 1993).
The problem is potentially great. In thirty of the thirty-six states that have
capital punishment, trial judges are either elected in contested elections
(partisan or non-partisan) or must run in retention elections (in which the
voters are asked whether a particular judge should be retained in office). ALA.
CONST. amend. 328, § 6.13; ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 17;
CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16; COLO. CONsT. art. 6, § 25; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 10 (b);
GA. CONST. art 6 § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12; IND.
CONST. art. 2, § 14; Ky. CONST. § 117; LA. CONST. art. 5, § 22; MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 5; Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 153; Mo. CONsT. art. 5, §§ 25(a)-25(c) (1); MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 5; N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 33; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9; OR. CONST. art. 7, § 1; PA. CONST.
art. 5, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 4; TEx. CONST. art. 5,§ 7; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 5; WvO. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
There is, of course, some ambiguity in the phrase "running for re-
election." Nevertheless, it would certainly include, for example, the time
between the date when a judge is required to file a declaration of candidacy to
succeed herself or himself and the date of the election. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art.
6, § 12 (d).
Analogous cases have also arisen. For example, the presidingjudge may be
running for re-election at trial, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), or at sentencing, State v.
Kynard, No. CC-88-35 (Cir. Ct., Perry Co., Ala., Sept. 12, 1990) (sentencing
continued on motion of defendant).
2. See generally I JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1988 & Supp. 1992); 3 WAYNE R. LA FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1984 & Supp. 1993).
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Amendment rights. (Under Stone v. Powell,3 an applicant who has
been provided with such an opportunity is not entitled to federal
habeas relief.)
Second, does this coincidence prevent a federal district
court from denying an evidentiary hearing under Townsend v.
Sain?4 In Townsend the United States Supreme Court listed six
circumstances under which a federal district court, after finding
that the applicant had alleged facts entitling the applicant to
relief, was obligated to hold a hearing. Among them were the
following: "(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing ... (6)
for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing."5
Third, does the simultaneousness of re-election campaign
and hearing deprive state court findings of fact of a presumption
of correctness which they would otherwise enjoy under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (d)? Under this section, the presumption of correctness
is lost, inter alia, if "a fact finding procedure employed by the
state was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing" or "if the
applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in
State court proceeding."6
Although these contexts are different - one involving a
possible total denial of relief, a second involving the necessity of
a hearing, and the third involving the possibly presumptive cor-
rectness of state court findings of fact - the language used in
the statute and cases is thus very similar. One can imagine that
the meaning of "full and fair" could vary with the context;7 never-
theless, if a state collateral fact-finding hearing is actually held
3. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
4. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
5. Id. at 313.
6. For a discussion of the relationship between Townsend v. Sain and 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d), see LIEBMAN, supra note 2, § 20.2.
7. For example, Stone v. Powell refers to an "opportunity," which, in
essence, can be waived through a failure to raise the issue in state court. This
"procedural default" bars federal habeas relief unless the applicant can show
cause and prejudice for the failure to raise a claim in a timely fashion, or a
miscarriage ofjustice. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992) (failure
to develop facts in state collateral proceedings); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.
Ct. 2546 (1991) (failure to file timely notice of appeal from judgment in
collateral proceedings); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1988) (failure to
include claim of error on appeal); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
(failure to raise Miranda issue at trial); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976) (failure to object prior to trial to grand jury's composition). Thus, one
who fails to raise an issue in state court may still be said to have had "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation." By contrast, Towsend v. Sain and 28
U.S.C. § 2954 (d) presuppose an absence of procedural default.
1994]
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and if there is no procedural default on the part of the applicant
(i.e., if appropriate objections and claims are timely made), the
meaning of this phrase is likely to be the same regardless of con-
text. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, dealing with a Fourth Amend-
ment issue, the Court cited Townsend v. Sain, dealing with the
need to hold an evidentiary hearing."
This article focuses narrowly on two stages of review of capi-
tal cases: (1) the first capital collateral proceeding in state court
and (2) the subsequent review of those proceedings by a federal
district court following the filing of a petition for federal habeas
corpus. These two stages provide a defendant with his or her
only opportunity to supplement, through the introduction of evi-
dence, an inadequate trial record. Since findings of fact made at
the trial level are seldom rejected by appellate courts, and since
most cases are won or lost on the facts, one cannot overempha-
size the importance of these two stages in general and, in particu-
lar, of the federal district court's treatment of state court findings
of fact.
II. DEFINITION OF "OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FAIR
LITIGATION"
Few federal cases have dealt with structural bars to a full and
fair hearing. That is, although one finds a number of federal
cases interpreting the phrases "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion" and "full and fair hearing,"9 there are few cases that outline
what circumstances beyond the control of the judge would con-
stitute a lack of full and fair hearing. Obviously, the need of a
particular judge to run for re-election at a particular time is a
circumstance beyond his or her control.
One case which arguably deals with a structural bar is Rose v.
Mitchell.1° In Rose, the applicants alleged that the trial judge had
selected the foreman of the grand jury on a racially discrimina-
tory basis, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. One of the preliminary issues that the
Supreme Court had to address was whether the ruling in Stone v.
8. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.36 (1976).
9. Compare, e.g., Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987)
(failure of state appellate court to deal with "fruit of the poisonous tree"
argument constituted absence of "opportunity" under Stone) with Caldwell v.
Cupp., 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986) (since petitioner was "given, and took
advantage of every opportunity to present evidence, to cross examine witnesses,
and argue the law," he had an "opportunity" under Stone even though the state
judge "did not articulate which facts, if any, supported the judge's legal
conclusions").
10. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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Powell would be applied in this context. In rejecting the applica-
tion of Stone, the Court said, in part:
In the first place, claims such as those pressed by respon-
dents in this case concerned allegations that the trial court
itself violated the Fourteenth Amendment in the operation
of the grand jury system. In most such cases, as in this one,
the same trial court will be the court that initially must
decide the merits of such a claim, finding facts and apply-
ing the law to those facts. This leads us to doubt that
claims that the operation of the grand jury system violates
the Fourteenth Amendment in general will receive the
type of full and fair hearing deemed essential to the hold-
ing of Stone."
In Rose, the trial judge was indeed the first judge to rule on
the applicant's claim, even though he was, in effect, the chief
witness in the case.12
Two other reported cases come close to raising the issue that
is the subject of this article. One, Sheppard v. Maxwell,i" is famous
for the Supreme Court's holding that a denial of due process
resulted from the trial judge's failure to deal appropriately with
"the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended
[the defendant's] prosecution." 4 The Supreme Court noted in
passing that the trial began two weeks before an election in
which the trial judge was to stand for re-election. The court of
appeals, however, had previously rejected Sheppard's claim of a
denial of due process, based on the timing of the re-election in
relation to the commencement of the trial:
11. Id. at 561.
12. Cf In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1955) (a judge acting as
"one-man grand jury" violated due process by publicly trying defendant for
contempt after citing defendant for contempt in secret; result followed from
judge's not being "wholly disinterested" in the outcome and from the denial of
defendant's right to cross-examine the judge, who was a material witness).
Presumably the judge in Rose also violated the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3 (C) (1972), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has .. . personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding."
The pertinent part of the MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (E)
(1990) is identical, as is the pertinent provision of the Tennessee Code on judi-
cial conduct. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
13. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
14. Id. at 335.
1994]
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Much has been made of the fact that the Sheppard trial
began on the eve of a judicial election at which the trial
judge and one of the prosection staff were candidates. We
must assume that this is emphasized to imply that desire
for victory may have led thejudge to conduct prejudicial to
Dr. Sheppard's rights. We would have to entertain a low
estimate of the integrity of our fellow judicial officers to
join in any such inference. In most of the states of the
Union it is traditional that those who occupy judicial office
be required from time to time to account for their steward-
ship by submitting to election. If it is suggested that we
presume that an elective judiciary can preserve constitu-
tional rights only at some undefined distance in time from
election day, we reject such suggestion out of hand. As
realists we know that those who seek re-election to judicial
office hope that their conduct will find public approval,
but we do not think thatjudicial misconduct would be more
attractive to the electorate than conduct marked by the
integrity which we as judges like to believe is possessed by
elected judges as well as those who have the security of ten-
ure during "good behavior." Nor are we prepared to pre-
sume that any judge is so far enamored of his position as to
betray its responsibilities, no matter what he thinks would
most please the electorate. Additionally, it is not inappro-
priate to note that much of the publicity complained of,
and the actual taking of testimony at Dr. Sheppard's trial,
occurred after the election had been held. For like rea-
sons, we must reject Dr. Sheppard's repetition in this Court
of his broadside charge "that the elective judges of Ohio
were so biased and prejudiced against him that he could
not expect fair adjudication of his case in state courts." 5
It should be noted that the issue as presented to the court of
appeals involved an allegation of a violation of due process at a
trial conducted before a jury; the precise issue raised in this arti-
cle, however, is whether ajudge (without the aid of ajury) can be
said to provide a full and fair hearing in a capital collateral pro-
ceeding. (When a jury is present, it decides most issues of fact;
thus, there is less opportunity for the judge to affect the outcome
of the case.)
In Brown v. Doe6 a federal habeas applicant complained in a
non-capital murder case of the trial judge's references to appli-
cant's trial in the judge's re-election campaign that occurred
15. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1965).
16. 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1993).
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shortly after applicant's sentencing. In rejecting applicant's
claims, the court of appeals said, in part:
Brown claims that a causal relationship between the trial
judge's electioneering and his earlier trial rulings can be
inferred here because of the strict security at trial, unspeci-
fied trial rulings, and the imposition of a maximum sen-
tence. None of these circumstances evidences partiality.
There is ample record support for the security measures
and the sentence, and overwhelming evidence of Brown's
guilt. On oral argument, Brown's attorney conceded that,
to reverse Brown's conviction, this Court would have to
rule in effect that no judge who is elected may preside in
sensational cases. We reject such a rule as incompatible
with federalism. We refuse to assume, as Brown asks us to
do, that all elected judges will invariably disregard their
oath and subvert justice in cases like his.17
Like Sheppard, this case is distinguishable from the situation
discussed in this article: Brown involves allegations of judicial
bias during ajury trial. In addition, and unlike Sheppard, Brown is
a non-capital case.
III. GIVING CONTENT TO "OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FAIR
LITIGATION"
In the absence of a precedent dealing specifically with a situ-
ation in which a judge is running for re-election at the time that
he or she conducts capital collateral proceedings, one must
resort to analogy. To do this we must consider the practical con-
sequences of a judge's ruling for the inmate in a death penalty
case while the judge is trying to convince the electorate that she
or he should be returned to office in a partisan election, non-
partisan election, or retention election (in which the voters are
17. Id. at 1249. In previously denying relief in this case, the district court
had said, in part:
Use of a trial in a judicial election contest occurring after the trial
cannot directly establish any right of petitioner to release. Nor is it
possible in this instance to infer retrospectively that the trial judge
conducted the trial with an eye to future benefit. On the other hand,
in the future, overt use of a trial to enhance the electability of the
jurist presiding at the trial can in a clear enough case become a
ground for considering habeas corpus relief. Flagrant disregard of such
a prospective rule - especially if called to the attention of the jurist
involved during or at the outset of the trial where counsel believes
such a conflict of interest may exist - would add to the strength of a
possible backward-looking inference that electoral considerations had
outweighed judicial ones during the trial.
803 F. Supp. 932, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
19941
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asked whether a particular judge should be retained in office).
These practical consequences cannot be assessed without refer-
ence to public attitudes towards the death penalty. For example,
from 1936 until 1991 (the last year in which Gallup surveyed atti-
tudes towards the death penalty), during only one year, 1966, was
the percentage of the electorate in favor of the death penalty
below fifty percent. (In 1966 the percentage in favor was forty-
two percent.)' 8 The percentage in favor of the death penalty in
June, 1991, was seventy-six percent;' 9 this is only slightly less than
the percentage of seventy-nine percent in 1988,2o the highest in
any of the Gallup surveys.
It is not simply that there is considerable public support for
the death penalty; one must also consider the intensity of feel-
ings surrounding the death penalty. To evaluate this, one need
only look at the retention election involving three justices of the
California Supreme Court in 1986. In that election, in which the
electorate was asked merely whether a particular justice should
be retained,21 ChiefJustice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Cruz
Reynoso and Joseph Grodin were rejected at the polls.22 In Rose
Bird's case, the margin of defeat was approximately two to one.23
Commentators have disagreed over the extent to which factors
other than the death penalty played a part in the rejection of
18. The Gallup Poll 129 (1991) (selected national trend).
19. Id. at 128.
20. Id. at 129. A review of national polls conducted since the beginning
of 1990 has revealed strong support for the death penalty. Search of LEXIS,
Market library, Rpoll file (Oct. 29, 1993) (data provided by Roper Center at
University of Connecticut): Survey by National Opinion Research Center, from
February 5, 1993, to April 26, 1993 (72%); Survey by Peter Hart and Breglio
Research Companies for NBC News and Wall Street Journal, from May 15,
1992, to May 19, 1992 (69%); Survey by ABC News and Washington Post, from
April 22, 1992, to April 26, 1992 (75%); Survey by Gallup Organization, from
November 7, 1991, to November 10, 1991 (73%); Survey by Gallup
Organization, from June 13, 1991, to June 16, 1991 (76%); Survey by Hart and
Teeter Research Companies for NBC News and Wall Street Journal, from May
10, 1991, to May 14, 1991 (71%); Survey by National Opinion Research Center
from February 1991 to April 1991 (72%); Survey by CBS News and New York
Times, from August 16, 1990, to August 19, 1990 (76%); Survey by Hart and
Teeter Research Companies for NBC News and Wall StreetJournal, from July 6,
1990, to July 10, 1990 (71%); Survey by CBS News and New York Times, from
March 30, 1990, to April 2, 1990 (72%); Survey by National Opinion Research
Center, from February 1990 to April 1990 (75%).
21. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 16(d).
22. John T. Wold &John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue ofJudicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348
(1987).
23. Id. at 351.
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these three justices.24 One of the commentators who argued that
factors other than the death penalty were involved nevertheless
described the campaign in part as follows:
The emotional appeal of the opponents connected two,
not necessarily related, situations. First, it emphasized the
undisputed proposition that despite the number of years
since the California Constitution had been amended to
expressly authorize the death penalty, there had been no
executions in the state. Then, in a constantly repeated
series of television spots, many times spotlighting relatives
of murder victims, it graphically depicted the circum-
stances of the crime, concluding with the statement that
the death penalty imposed upon the defendant had been
reversed.25
Other commentators have described the role of the death
penalty issue as follows: "Of apparent primary concern was the
three jurists' perceived opposition to the death penalty; of secon-
dary concern, the justices' perceived leniency towards criminal
defendants generally."
26
Yet another commentator observed: "The election reflected
frustration on one issue - the death penalty. Thirty second tele-
vision spots urged voters to cast three votes for the death penalty:
'No on Bird,' 'No on Grodin,' 'No on Reynoso.' 27
The importance of the death penalty issue was not lost on
Joseph Grodin, one of the three defeated justices. In writing
about the election, he noted:
There is no doubt whatsoever what the voters thought the
issue was; exit polls showed that of the voters who voted
against the chiefjustice, only 11 per cent gave as a reason
that she was not qualified, and only 18 per cent that she
was too liberal; 66 per cent said that it was because she
opposed the death penalty, and clearly that was their view
regarding Justice Reynoso and myself as well.28
24. Compare Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial
Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2007, 2036 (1988) (cataloguing reasons why various parts of the electorate
were potentially hostile to Chief Justice Bird and two of her colleagues) with
John L. Hill, Jr., Comments on Thompson and Observations Concerning Impartiality,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2065 (1988) and Gerald F. Uelman, Commentay: Are we
Reprising a Final or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2069 (1988).
25. Thompson, supra note 24, at 2038-39.
26. Wold & Culver, supra note 22, at 353.
27. Uelman, supra note 24, at 2070.
28. Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial Elections: The California Experience, 70
JUDICATURE 365, 367 (1987). FormerJustice Grodin also stated:
1994]
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Of equal importance for our purposes is the fact that the
rejection of the three California Supreme CourtJustices received
considerable national publicity,29 none the least of which was the
coverage in the American Bar Association Journal, in which it was
acknowledged that the election was "dominated by hysteria about
the death penalty."3 ° Given this publicity, it seems unlikely that
any sitting judge who is up for re-election can be unaware of the
potentially disastrous consequences of appearing to oppose the
death penalty by ruling in favor of a death-row inmate.
Accordingly, the closest analogy is the situation in which a
judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case. The
United States Supreme Court has made it clear in a series of
cases that it is a denial of due process for a litigant to be faced
with a judge who has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
case.3" The interest that suffices to disqualify under the due pro-
cess clause has certainly been held to be less than the loss of
one's total salary. (And certainly a judge who was rejected at the
polls because of perceived opposition to the death penalty would
suffer a total loss of salary for as long as it took to obtain new
employment.) In Aetna Life Insurance Company v. La Voie,"2 for
example, the Supreme Court ruled that an Alabama Supreme
Court Justice was disqualified constitutionally because he eventu-
ally profited to the extent of $30,000.00. This $30,000.00 in
December 1984 was less than his salary for one year, 33 not to
mention his salary for succeeding years. In Ward v. Village of
Justice Otto Kaus, after he left the bench, acknowledged the possibility
that a key vote of his, during the 1982 campaign when he was on the
ballot, may have been affected by the pendency of that election - at a
subconscious level - he could not say. There is profound truth, as
well as great candor, in that acknowledgement.
Id. at 368.
29. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Towards a More Just and Effective System of Review
in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 At. U. L. REV. 1, 60-61 n.130 (1990); Aric Press et
al., A Vote on the Quality of Mercy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1986, at 63.
30. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., April 1987, at 52.
31. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Connally v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
This due process line of cases needs to be distinguished from cases
interpreting the federal statutory provision dealing with judicial
disqualification. See generally Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847 (1988) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 455).
32. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
33. The annual salary was approximately $58,000 in 1984. Telephone
Conversation with Hazel Johnson, Reference Librarian, University of Alabama
School of Law (Nov. 2, 1993).
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Monroeville,34 the Supreme Court declared the judge disqualified
constitutionally even though the financial interest was not a per-
sonal one. Instead, he had a financial interest that was of an
institutional sort; he was responsible for administering the affairs
of the city, and his decision to impose fines resulted in monies'
going into the city coffers.
If due process precludes a judge from sitting, one would
have to conclude that any hearing held by such a judge did not
afford an applicant an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
issues in the case.3 5
As the preceding discussion indicates, it would be possible to
argue that ajudge who is running for re-election should be consti-
tutionally disqualified for collateral proceedings involving a
death-row inmate at the time the judge is running for re-elec-
tion.3 6 Indeed, one could make a broader argument - namely,
that due process is violated whenever a judge subject to re-elec-
tion (or a retention election) sits in a case in which one of the
parties is either wildly popular or unpopular.3 7 Such an argu-
34. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
35. Logically, a violation of due process must deprive a hearing of the
capacity to provide "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" or a "full and fair
hearing." After all, the Constitution provides minimum protections; non-
constitutional standards must provide greater protections if they are different
from constitutional protections. This conclusion is supported by a
consideration and comparison of subsections (6) and (7) of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(d) (6)-(d) (7):
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding.
The use of "otherwise" in subsection (7) indicates that the subsection refers to
violations of due process different from those already set forth in subsection
(6); the implication, of course, is that subsection (6) describes a violation of
due process that is narrower than the more inclusive category of subsection (7).
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text and infra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
36. Such an argument was made, and rejected, in regard to the trial judge
in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384
U.S. 333 (1966).
37. Such an argument would be especially compelling where the judge
stands for re-election frequently, e.g., every four years, as in Texas, TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 7; and Georgia, GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, 1.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in dictum in Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822-24 (1986), that few claims of bias beyond
those arising from pecuniary interest could be sustained under a due process
analysis, the Court in that very case equated financial interest with the interest
of the judge in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), in vindicating his own
prior charge of contempt against the defendant; the Court referred to the
judge as having been "a judge in his own case." 475 U.S. at 822. The Judge's
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ment would find support in a number of policy considerations:
that the nature of the judicial function encompasses a need to
preserve the proper balance between majority rule and minority
rights3" and a need to provide for competent, representative
judges, 9 neither of which can be satisfied through popular elec-
tion of the judiciary. This argument would also be supported by
the following facts: collateral proceedings often extend over a
period of years, and judicial decisions taken substantially before
an election can affect the conduct of a hearing during an elec-
tion campaign. Certainly judges conducting capital collateral
proceedings are aware of these facts.
Although one could thus make a good faith argument that
the due process clause precludes having elected judges sit in con-
troversial cases, it is not necessary to make such an argument in
order to reach the conclusion that, for purposes of habeas corpus,
a hearing conducted by a judge who is running for re-election
cannot be deemed a full and fair hearing when the applicant is a
death-row inmate because of the judge's warranted fear that deci-
sions favorable to such an inmate will result in the judge's defeat
in the pending election. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has
said that death is "different,"40 and has sometimes required pro-
cedures in capital cases that are not required in other cases.4"
bias in Murchison was thus not pecuniary but nevertheless constitutionally
disqualifying.
38. See generally Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality
and Representativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 421 (1981).
39. I have argued that a broadly representative judiciary is required by
analogy to the jury, and that competent and representative judges can be
selected, first, by providing for a broadly representative nominating commission
consisting of perhaps twelve members (e.g., two lawyers elected by lawyers, two
judges elected by judges, two academicians elected by academicians, and six
members elected by the public through proportional representation) who can
nominate twelve candidates, and, second, by providing for final selection by lot
from among the twelve nominees. Id. at 432-51.
40. "In [Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)], members of the Court
acknowledged what cannot fairly be denied - that death is a punishment
different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree." Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).
41. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (defendant's due
process rights were violated when judge at sentencing relied on pre-sentence
report that was not disclosed to defense counsel) (plurality opinion).
Sometimes the Court has refused to provide special procedures for death
penalty cases. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (death-row
inmates not always entitled to appointed counsel in collateral proceedings).
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IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that, in light of the extent and emotional
intensity of the public's support for the death penalty, no capital
collateral hearing before a judge running for re-election (or
retention) should be regarded as having provided an "opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation" or a "full and fair hearing" for
purposes of Stone v. Powell, Townsend v. Sain, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The importance of federal habeas corpus review of
state impositions of the death penalty cannot be overemphasized.
Direct review, even in the United States Supreme Court, cannot
be counted on to correct trial errors; indeed, that is not the pur-
pose of review by the Supreme Court.4 2 Moreover, even it that
Court were inclined to correct trial error, one could not ignore
the practical difficulty of getting one's case before the U.S.
Supreme Court: although there have been over five thousand
applications to the Supreme Court each year (recently), the
Court has decided only about three percent of these cases on the
merits.4" This is to be contrasted, of course, with the situation in
federal habeas corpus, in which each litigant can receive an adjudi-
cation by a federal judge.4 4 Thus I would disagree with the view
that "the argument for freedom from electoral accountability to
afford protection of minority rights is weaker in the case of state
judges than it is in the case of federal judges simply because the
article III judges exist to protect these rights."4 5 This statement
can be true only if there is the practical possibility of review of
decisions of the state court judges in the federal system. This
review cannot be effective if the holding of a state collateral hear-
ing unreasonably limits the ability of a United States district
court to render relief.4 6 Thus, if the view expressed in the quota-
42. See Sup. CT. R. 10.
43. In the 1991 term of the U.S. Supreme Court, ending in June 1992,
the Court disposed of 5825 cases, but only 194 of these were decided on the
merits. Of the 194, only 114 were cases in which opinions (either signed or per
curiam) were written. Perhaps the most telling statistic is the percentage of
cases on the miscellaneous docket (in forma pauperis) in which review was
granted: 0.5%. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARv. L. REv. 19, 378, 382
(1992).
44. This statement must be qualified, of course, by the acknowledgment
that under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), federal habeas review is not
possible if there has been "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of Fourth
Amendment issues; similarly an applicant may be precluded from obtaining
relief by procedural default. See supra note 7.
45. Thompson, supra note 24, at 2055.
46. See supra note 40. For a discussion of the ominous trends in the
Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence, see James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next
Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM.
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tion immediately above is to have any validity at all, it is essential
that federal fact-finding hearings be available in any death pen-
alty case in which the state fact-finding hearing is held before a
judge who is running for re-election.
Admittedly this conclusion runs contrary to the view of fed-
eralism apparently held by a majority of the present members of
the United States Supreme Court.47 Federalism, however, is not
necessarily the ultimate value in our constitutional scheme.
Indeed, the protection of individual rights through amendments
to the Constitution was a matter discussed during the ratifying
conventions in a number of key states prior to ratification of the
original Constitution; concern over this issue prompted Congress
during its first session to propose the Bill of Rights. 48 And it is
not obvious that the states have been more responsible for the
protection of individual rights than the federal government has
L. REv. 1997 (1992). Professor Liebman's fears were partly realized in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714, 1722 (1993) (abandonment in federal
habeas corpus of Chapman harmless error rule in favor of rule placing upon
applicant the burden of showing that the prosecution's unconstitutional use of
applicant's post-Miranda silence "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.").
47. In Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991), for example,
Justice O'Connor began her opinion for the Court by saying, "This is a case
about federalism." Only in the second paragraph did she acknowledge that
petitioner's life was at stake. Apart from rhetoric, the majority in Coleman,
consisting ofJustices O'Connor, White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, concluded, in essence, that it was more important to enforce
the state's rule requiring timely filing of a notice of appeal from a decision of
the state circuit court in a capital collateral proceeding than to permit a death-
row inmate to secure federal review of his conviction and death sentence. The
majority never satisfactorily explained how the state would be prejudiced by
allowing such review. (This was not a case of something improperly done or
omitted at trial, for example - a mistake that might have prevented the trial
court from taking corrective action at the only time it could have been
effective.) In essence, the Court enforced a rule of agency with a vengeance -
or, to put it somewhat differently, a rule providing for the killing of the client
because the attorney blundered. Following Coleman, Justice Marshall, a
dissenter in Coleman, was replaced by Justice Thomas, and Justice White was
replaced by Justice Ginsberg. The majority position in Coleman does not appear
threatened by this change.
More recently, Justice Scalia has expressed the view that no claim of a
violation of a state defendant's federal constitutional rights should be reviewed
in federal habeas corpus if the state has provided that defendant with an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" of defendant's claim unless the claim
"goes to the fairness of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate
result." Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1768 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
48. See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, George Mason on the Tension Between
Minority Rule and Minority Rights, 10 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 1, 16-17 nn.61-63
and accompanying text (1987).
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been. One could make the contrary argument by noting some
other historical facts: it was the federal government that ended
slavery;49 it was the federal government that sought to put an
end to desegregation;"0 it was the federal government that gave
women and minorities the right to vote;5" it was the federal gov-
ernment that took the lead in the 1960s in trying to ensure that
the constitutional rights of defendants in criminal cases were
protected. 52 It may be that in recent years state courts - or at
least some of them - have done a better job than they did previ-
ously of protecting the constitutional rights of such defendants.
5 3
It is also true, of course, that providing a hearing before a judge
with life tenure is no guarantee that constitutional rights will be
respected. 4 Nevertheless, the rates of reversal in federal courts
of state court convictions and sentences in capital cases 55 do not
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
50. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny.
51. U.S. CONST. amends. XIX and XV.
52. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel
in serious criminal cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary
rule applied to the states).
53. See, e.g., People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting
the Supreme Court's relaxed standard of probable cause enunciated in Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976)
(rejecting Supreme Court's holding concerning the breadth of state power to
inventory the contents of automobiles without probable cause).
54. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (finding of no
ineffective assistance of counsel despite failure of counsel at sentencing to
introduce evidence of defendant's abusive childhood, and finding of no
conflict of interest on appeal even though same attorney on appeal represented
co-defendants each of whom was trying to show that the other one was primarily
culpable).
55. "The success rate of non-capital habeas petitions is low, with estimates
ranging from 0.25% to 3.2% to 7%. The success rate in capital habeas is much
higher, however: 60-75% as of 1982, 70% as of 1983, and 60% as of 1986."
Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death
Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 520-21 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
The activities of "hanging judges" in Texas, for example, are concrete
evidence of the need for federal habeas review. See Brent E. Newton, The
Death Penalty in Texas, 1973-93, at 76-80 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). An empirical study comparing state court and federal court decisions
has concluded that "there is simply no widespread disregard for the vindication
of federal rights in state appellate courts." Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis
of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 252 (1983). As the quote
indicates, however, this study does not deal either generally with state trial court
findings of fact or specifically with federal habeas review of state capital
collateral proceedings. A study of enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights in
Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Utah has concluded that many of these states are conscientiously
enforcing the Fourth Amendment; nevertheless, "Georgia plainly, and possibly
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provide a basis for concluding that all state courts are yet able to
correct the potentially fatal errors of counsel and state trial
judges. The possibility of correction in federal habeas corpus must
be preserved if the administration of the death penalty in the
United States is to come remotely close to the ideal of non-arbi-
trariness proclaimed in the Supreme Court's death penalty
decisions.5"
South Carolina and Arizona, are not enforcing the fourth amendment." Craig M.
Bradley, Are States Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary Study, 77 GEO.
L.J. 251, 286 (1988) (emphasis added). This study also did not focus on the
death penalty.
56. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
